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TILA: The Textualist-Intentionalist Litmus Act?
Caroline Hatton*
Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship. Once scorned
and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the ballroom.1

I. Introduction
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)2 is a broad, consumer-protective statute that requires
lenders to disclose their terms to consumers and governs the manner and timing of this disclosure
in a range of commercial transactions. TILA’s rescission provision3 allows consumers to annul
contracts made without the disclosure TILA requires, and its codification as Regulation Z4
prescribes the manner in which rescission may be accomplished.
Courts have found Regulation Z’s prescription to be as clear as doctor’s-pad scribble and
have employed different interpretive methodologies to decipher exactly what steps consumers
must take to rescind. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits determined via intentionalist analysis that
consumers must file a complaint with the court to effectuate rescission.5 The Third and Fourth
Circuits, on the other hand, concluded from textualist readings of the statute that borrowers can
rescind by notifying lenders.6 As district courts around the country enter decisions on the matter,
the rift created by adherence to these two interpretive schools is growing ever deeper.
The Supreme Court will undoubtedly determine the procedural requirement for rescission
under TILA. The Court will likely address the true nature of the Circuit split surrounding the
rescission requirement. Is the provision headed for a textualist-intentionalist showdown?
*
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Servs., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2013).
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Not necessarily, because this central conflict masks two less conspicuous but potentially
dispositive questions: first, should lower courts be bound by conjectural Court dicta; second,
should the Court defer to the agency that how holds regulatory authority over TILA, although
that agency did not exist when TILA was codified? To see how what appears to be a textualistintentionalist clash holds dramatic consequences both for the scope of precedent and for
administrative law, it is necessary to trace the history of TILA and recent TILA litigation.
Congress enacted TILA in 1968 to combat deceptive practices by predatory lenders that
left consumers unaware of the nature of the credit obligations they undertook and unable to
conduct meaningful comparison of offers.7 “Joseph Barr, then Under Secretary of the Treasury,
noted in testifying before a Senate subcommittee that such blind economic activity is
inconsistent with the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours . . . .”8
TILA, an intended remedy for these commercial ills, is accordingly broad in scope. As
Senator Paul Douglas announced in proposing TILA, “this bill does not provide for judgment
solely on the basis of the . . . annual interest rate or the total finance charges. It also provides
that there shall be a statement of the cash price or delivery price of the property or service to be
acquired.”9 By requiring lenders to disclose both total price and finance charges, “the judgment
of the consumer can be on the basis of both of these factors, not merely on one alone.”10
TILA’s introductory provision adopts these broad goals of enhanced economic
stabilization and strengthened “competition among the various financial institutions . . . engaged
in the extension of consumer credit.”11 TILA aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit

See Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363–364 (1973).
Id. at 363–64.
9
Id. at 367–68 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the
S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 447–48 (1961) (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
10
Id. at 368 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
11
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2013).
7
8
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terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him.”12 This “awareness of the cost” of credit will lead to “the informed use of
credit” by consumers, which, in turn, will strengthen the American economy.13
Congress framed TILA in general terms to leave room for the Federal Reserve Board (the
“Board”) to adapt TILA enforcement to creditor schemes. “Congress was clearly aware that
merchants could evade the reporting requirements of the Act by concealing credit charges. In
delegating rulemaking authority to the Board, Congress emphasized the Board’s authority to
prevent such evasion.”14 The Board exercised its sweeping power “by promulgating Regulation
Z, 12 [C.F.R.] Part 226 (1979), which at least partly fills the statutory gaps.”15
Although Regulation Z addresses many modes of consumer manipulation, “[e]ven
Regulation Z . . . cannot speak explicitly to every credit disclosure issue.”16 The Court issued an
interpretive directive for when neither TILA itself, nor Regulation Z, speaks directly to a new
strain of consumer deception: “consider the implicit character of the statutory scheme.”17 In
construing TILA-derived causes of action, in other words, courts must be guided by TILA’s
consumer-protective purpose.
In furtherance of its consumer-protective purpose, TILA gives borrowers the right to
rescind loan agreements that do not comply with TILA. The relevant section provides that “[a]n
obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the

12

Id.
Id.
14
Mourning, 411 U.S. at 371. In fact, the Court observed, “[t]o hold that Congress did not intend the Board to take
action against this type of manipulation would require us to believe that, despite this emphasis, Congress intended
the obligations established by the Act to be open to evasion by subterfuges of which it was fully aware.” Id. The
Court then firmly rejected this possibility: “[T]he language of the enabling provision precludes us from accepting so
narrow an interpretation of the Board’s power.” Id.
15
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560 (1980).
16
Id.
17
Id.
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transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”18 Regulation Z, in turn, sets
forth specific manners in which borrowers may notify lenders of their intent to rescind:
(2) To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the
creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of
written communication. Notice is considered given when mailed,
or when filed for telegraphic transmission, or, if sent by other
means, when delivered to the creditor’s designated place of
business. (3) . . . If the required notice and material disclosures
are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after the
occurrence giving rise to the right of rescission, or upon transfer of
all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of the
property, whichever occurs first.19
As detailed as this provision appears, courts are now grappling with its scope with some
frequency. In order to trigger rescission within the three year limit, what must a consumer do?
Neither TILA nor Regulation Z answers this question directly. Indeed, a key sentence in
12 C.F.R. § 15(a)(2)—“To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of
the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication.”—is subject to two
irreconcilable interpretations: either notice is a sufficient condition (as soon as the consumer
notifies that creditor, the right to rescind has been exercised), or it is merely a necessary one (the
right to rescind cannot be exercised without providing notice to the creditor).
Courts have tied the necessary-or-sufficient-condition determination to a choice of
interpretive methodologies, with the intentionalists reading the notice as necessary and the
textualists reading it to be sufficient. Curiously, those courts that stress Congressional intent are
the same courts that limit consumer rescission to preserve clarity of title,20 a stance seemingly at
odds with TILA’s self-proclaimed pro-consumer purpose.21 The textualists, on the other hand,

18

15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2013).
12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)(2)–(3) (2013).
20
This can be seen in recent decisions from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. See infra Part III.
21
See supra, text accompanying notes 8 and 9.
19
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who strive to apply Congress’s words without heed to what Congress might have meant to say,
read the regulation as requiring only notice.22
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has filed multiple amicus briefs
urging a strict textualist interpretation of this statute and regulation, such as the approach adopted
by the conservative Fourth Circuit.23 Created in 201024 and operational as of 2011,25 the CFPB
was not even a gleam in the eye of the executive branch when the Board promulgated Regulation
Z back in 1969.26 Now, however, the CFPB has taken over the reins of TILA. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, “[t]he Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is ‘the primary source for
interpretation and application of truth-in-lending law.’”27

Consequently, the CFPB’s

interpretation of TILA regulations warrants judicial deference, and its strong policy arguments
support the notice-as-sufficient reading of TILA’s rescission provision.

22

See infra Part III. It is tempting to look for a reflection of politics in this split, but it has become increasingly
difficult to associate interpretive methodologies with political leanings. See infra notes 18, 23. For an excellent
discussion of the correlation between political affiliation and panel voting, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE,
LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, 17–40 (2006).
23
See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More to Come (Apr. 16, 2012, 2:10 PM),
http://mondaq-business.vlex.com/vid/cfpb-files-amicus-in-tila-case-more-365470614. Could this be another sign
that the Fourth Circuit has begun to shift to the left? For a concise discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s conservative
past and recent ideological movement, see David Stout, 4th Circuit Turns Left, Leaving ‘Most Conservative’ Label
Behind (Nov. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/11/23/4th-circuit-turns-left-leaving-mostconservative-label-behind/.
24
See The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Oct.
24, 2012) (“The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act)
established the consumer bureau. In January of 2012, President Obama appointed Rich Cordray to be the first
Director of the CFPB.”).
25
See Wally Adeyemo, September 2010: Transfer Date Announced, CFPB BLOG (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/2011/02/ (“Less than two months after President Obama signed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced that
the one-year anniversary of the law—July 21, 2011—will serve as the ‘designated transfer date’ . . . when consumer
financial protection functions of seven federal agencies will transfer to the CFPB.”).
26
See Gambardella v. G. Fox & Co., 716 F.2d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The FRB promulgated Regulation Z in
1969.”).
27
Id. at 7–8, (quoting Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004)).
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Although it is somewhat surprising that the CFPB, the product of a liberal administration,
advocates a textualist construction of section 1635(f),28 it comes as no surprise that TILA
rescission has become a textualist-intentionalist battleground: TILA has hosted such wars in the
past. In Koons Buick, a divided Court explored both the meaning and the proper manner of
interpreting TILA’s Damages-Ceiling Provision.29

In Beach, a unanimous Court held that

TILA’s rescission provision fully extinguishes the right to rescind unlike a statute of limitations,
which would extinguish only the right to file a cause of action.30 Though the Court employed a
textual analysis in reaching this decision, its conclusion stressed importance of legislative intent.
Courts involved in the current circuit split have been deciding not only whether notice
suffices to trigger TILA rescission, but also the relevance of the Court’s decision in Beach.31
Because Beach is not exactly on point, it would govern only to the extent that the interpretive
mechanism it employs should be extended to other TILA provisions. The question thus becomes
whether methodological precedent can be set, and, if so, what it exactly it would impose upon
lower courts. The applicability of Beach is polarizing, with the intentionalists declaring Beach to
control and the textualists rejecting Beach as unrelated.
This comment will argue that, in determining how TILA rescission is accomplished, the
Court should also find that Beach does not control and should instead defer to the CFPB’s
interpretation. Although the circuits present these issues in textualist and intentionalist terms, the
Court need not—and should not—name either interpretive methodology victorious.

Both

The CFPB’s textualism corresponds with the rise of “New Textualism.” For a discussion of the important trend
among liberals to perform textualist analysis, see, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Rosen on the "New Textualism",
PRAWFSBLAWG (June 13, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/rosen-on-the-newtextualism.html.
29
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004); see infra Part II.A.
30
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998); see infra Part II.B.
31
See infra Part II.
28
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schools are fundamentally positivistic. By allowing them to coexist, the Court has created an
epistemological friction that transcends the rigidity either method would impose on its own.
Part II of this comment explores the textualist-intentionalist clash in the Court’s Koons
Buick decision. The many opinions written in this case offer a glimpse of what a decision
regarding the rescission mechanism might, and should, look like. Part II next explores Beach—
and its limits. Beach incarnates the other great interpretive clash in TILA’s history.
Part III moves forward to the current circuit split, which continues to expand as new
decisions are handed down. Subpart A focuses on the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ intentionalist
view of rescission. Subpart B explores the Third and Fourth Circuits’ textualist readings of
Regulation Z.
Part IV.A argues that the Court should declare Beach inapposite; Part IV.B, that the
Court should defer to the CFPB’s interpretation of Regulation Z. Part V, the conclusion, revisits
the background and stakes of the current circuit split. Despite the textualist-intentionalist lines
along which the Circuits examine TILA rescission, the Court should resolve the issue without
favoring either interpretive school.
II. Past TILA battles
A. A Subparagraph by Any Other Name: The Damages-Ceiling Dispute
Until 1995, the provision32 that sets guidelines for TILA damages awards, read:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails
to comply with any requirement imposed under this part . . . with
respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to
the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice
the amount of any finance charge in connection with the
transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to a
consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of
the total monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability
32

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2012).
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under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater
than $1000 . . . .33
Courts widely held that the $100–$1000 limit applied both to subpart (i) and to subpart (ii),
which were viewed as parts of the same “subparagraph.”34 Thus, the range of $100–$1000 was
applied to all damage awards set forth in § 1640(a)(2).
The statute remained unaltered from 1976 to 1995, when obfuscation struck: in its Act
of September 30, 1995, Congress amended subsection (a)(2) by “substitut[ing] ‘(ii)’ for ‘or (ii)’
and inserting]” a third subpart.35 As a result, 15 USC § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) now reads:
. . . any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of – .
. . (2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any
finance charge in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of an
individual action relating to a consumer lease under part E of this
subchapter, 25 per centum of the total monthly payments under the lease,
except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100
nor greater than $1000, or (iii) in the case of an individual action relating
to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan that is secured by
real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than $2000 . . . .36
Could “under this subparagraph” continue to apply to both parts (i) and (ii) when it manifestly
could not apply to (iii), or did the 1995 iteration of the statute effectively detach the first part
from the second, such that the ceiling could now apply only to part (ii)? Did Congress, without
any change to the signifier employed, alter that which it signified?
The Seventh Circuit was the first to take aim at the moving target created by Congress’s
1995 amendment. After affirming that the statute was clear and unambiguous until the 1995

33

15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1980).
See Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 55–56 (2004) (“Following the insertion of the consumer lease provision, courts
consistently held that the $100/$1,000 limitation remained applicable to all consumer financing transactions,
whether lease or loan.”) (citing Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996); Cowen v. Bank
United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65,
67 (4th Cir. 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke's Arrow Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 358, 359 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979)).
35
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2013).
36
Id.
34
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addition, 37 the Strange court announced that the addendum “was designed simply to establish a
more generous minimum and maximum for certain secured transactions [i.e. those secured by
real estate], without changing the rule on minimum and maximum damage awards for the other
two parts of § 1640(a)(2)(A).”38
With its connotations of draftsmanship seasoned with hints of intent,39 “designed” is a
succinct masterstroke of evasion. Indeed, the court matched the statutory ambiguity of which it
complains with an exegetical ambiguity no less notable. The structural aspect of “designed”—
design as draftsmanship—evokes textualism; the purpose-driven, plotting aspect implicates
intentionalism. Without offering any further insight into its reasoning, the Strange court simply
concluded that “the ‘subparagraph’ mentioned in § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) continues to encompass
what is now codified as subparts (A)(i) and (A)(ii), not just subpart (A)(ii).”40
The Fourth Circuit took a more direct and explicit approach in Nigh.41 Judge Gregory’s
dissent lauds “the Seventh Circuit’s well-reasoned analysis,”42 and even the Nigh majority
remarked that “[i]t could well be . . . that Congress did not intend to alter the statutory cap
applicable under subparagraph (A)(i) when it amended the statute in 1995.”43 The majority,
however, emphatically refused to meander down what-if street, asserting that “the critical point
of law—and it is critical—is that we do not know what Congress intended; all that we have
before us is the amended statute from which to determine intent.”44 Noting staunchly that “[i]t is
the statute, not any inferential intent, that constitutes the law,” the majority held that “Congress

37

Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. (emphasis added).
39
See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 459 (2d ed. 2005) (offering as a second definition: “do or plan
(something) with a specific purpose or intention in mind”).
40
Strange, 129 F.3d at 947.
41
Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003).
42
Id. at 132 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
43
Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
44
Id.
38
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did alter the statutory cap regardless of its intent” and observed that Congress was free to amend
the statute if it “enacted into law something different from what it intended.”45 The majority
anchored its textualist approach to the separation of powers, affirming that “[i]n this way, and in
this way only, are the constitutional roles of the legislature and the courts respected.”46
The Fourth Circuit majority found that, “by striking the ‘or’ preceding (ii), and inserting
(iii) after the ‘under this subparagraph’ phrase,” Congress “rendered [the application of the limit
set forth in (ii) to the entirety of § 1640(a)(2)(A)] defunct.”47 Thus, “Congress’s amendment
requires that the reference point of the ‘under this subparagraph’ clause be the subparagraph of §
1640 (a)(2)(A)(ii), and not the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(i).”48 The Nigh majority read
the word “subparagraph” as having a reduced scope of reference rather than a new meaning.49
A divided Supreme Court weighed in to resolve the split that the Fourth Circuit created
with respect to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in its Koons Buick decision.50

The several

concurrences and lone dissenting opinion question this approach. The Court’s fractured response
gives some insight into how the current rescission-provision split may fare when it goes up.
Koons Buick provides a full spectrum of approaches ranging from extreme intentionalism to
radical textualism. In between, the Justices offer possible models of coexistence for the two
interpretive methodologies.
The Court ultimately held that the Seventh Circuit had the right of it and, in so doing,
adopted a moderately intentionalist approach. Justice Ginsburg notes in her plurality opinion
that Congress’s “[l]ess-than-meticulous drafting of the 1995 amendment [(to 15 U.S.C. §
45

Id.
Id.
47
Nigh, 319 F.3d at 126.
48
Id. at 127.
49
One may wonder at this point whether “subparagraph” should ever have been understood to encompass § (A)(i) as
well as (A)(ii). An abundance of circuit decisions applied the ceiling to both provisions. See supra note 34. The
lack of legislative backlash in response to these decisions might suggest legislative ratification of this interpretation.
50
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
46
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1640(a)(2)(A))] created an ambiguity,”51 but that the ambiguity was solely textual in nature.
“The purpose of the 1995 amendment,” the Justice stresses, “is not in doubt: Congress meant to
raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans secured by real property.”52
Guided by this purpose and finding “scant indication that Congress simultaneously sought to
remove the $1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property,”53 the Court declined to interpret
the textual ambiguity as requiring removal,54 concluding instead that “‘this is a case where
common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’ that an
amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently described by
its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill.’”55
Although the majority attributes great significance to Congressional intent, or the absence
thereof, it frames its intentionalist inquiry as a “step two” that can only follow a preliminary
finding of textual ambiguity.56

Thus, though Justice Ginsburg applies a strong form of

intentionalism—the determination of what was meant as a function of what was not said—the
Justice simultaneously subordinates intentionalist analysis to an initial textual inquiry.57 Justice
Ginsburg’s textualist-intentionalist compromise garnered the signatures of a plurality of the

51

Id. at 53.
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id. at 63–64 (“[T]he text does not dictate this result [(i.e. removing the limit)]; the statutory history suggests
otherwise; and there is scant indication Congress meant to change the well-established meaning of clause (i).”).
55
Id. at 61 (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. I.R.S., 484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987)).
56
Justice Ginsburg makes the secondary nature of the Court’s inquiry into congressional intent clear, observing that
“[t]he statutory history resolves any ambiguity whether the $100/$1,000 brackets apply to recoveries under clause
(i).” Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 62 (2004). Justice Ginsburg’s textualist inquiry is
notable in another respect as well: it marks the first time a Justice invoked the legislative drafting manuals used by
Congress as interpretive authority. For an excellent discussion of this jurisprudential landmark, see B. J. Ard,
Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. 185,
186–89 (2012).
57
In finding significance in Justice Ginsburg’s granting of primacy to the textualist inquiry, I disagree with Jonathan
T. Molot, who finds that when “two interpreters use the same interpretive tools to reach the same interpretive result,
[it doesn’t] really matter that one (the textualist) purports to use context to decide on a textual meaning while the
other (the purposivist) admits that he is adjusting the text’s meaning to reconcile it with the context.” Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
52
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Justices, and may indicate how the current circuit split will fall.58 The many other opinions
proffered in Koons Buick, of course, offer possible alternatives.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred to assert a stronger form of
intentionalism.59 Rather than “only look at legislative history for the purpose of resolving textual
ambiguities or to avoid absurdities,” Justice Stevens admonishes, “[i]t would be wiser to
acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’[s] true
intent when interpreting its work product,”60 because “[c]ommon sense is often more reliable
than rote repetition of canons of statutory construction.”61 Decrying “wooden reliance on those
canons,”62 the Justice asserts that “an unambiguous text describing a plausible policy decision” is
not “a sufficient basis for determining the meaning of a statute.”63 Noting that the Court “cannot
escape [the] unambiguous statutory command by proclaiming that it would produce an absurd
result,” Justice Stevens notes that it “can, however, escape by using common sense.”64 To apply
common sense to the present matter involves contemplating the provision’s history, which
reveals that “a busy Congress is fully capable of enacting a scrivener’s error into law.”65 This
willingness to find statutory error based on conclusions regarding Congressional intent rather
than agrammaticality or implausibility is intentionalism at its most extreme.66

58

Not all Justices agree that the text is truly ambiguous. Some suggest, rather, that the Court imputed ambiguity to
the text in order to justify extratextual analysis. See discussion of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion and Justice
Scalia’s dissent on pages 15–16.
59
Justice Stevens has been described as “the Court’s leading intentionalist.” Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 325 (1998) (citing Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 357 (1994)); William D. Popkin, An
“Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1992).
60
Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 66–67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62
Id. at 67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63
Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
One scholar describes Justice Stevens as “the leader of the intentionalist camp,” holding the pole opposite the one
held by Justice Scalia in the “textualist-intentionalist divide.” See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41260,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 9–11 (2012).
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by the Chief Justice, advocates a more guarded
form of intentionalism. It approves the consultation of “extratextual sources”67 in the present
matter because “the text is not altogether clear.

That means that examination of other

interpretive resources, including predecessor statutes, is necessary for a full and complete
understanding of the congressional intent.”68 Justice Kennedy describes intent as a tie-breaker to
determine which of two equally plausible readings of the word “subparagraph” should govern.69
Textualism is the default rule in statutory interpretation; intentionalism, a failsafe to be applied
on an as-needed basis, where need is determined not by notions of common sense but by the
words of the statute. Whereas Justice Ginsburg’s intentionalism gets the final word and thus
eclipses her textual analysis,70 Justice Kennedy establishes a strict text–intent hierarchy.71
Justice Thomas concurred to voice agreement with the results—though not with the
analytical method—of the majority. Justice Thomas advocates a textualist approach,72 noting
that “[i]f the text in this case were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted.”73

67

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 67 (2004). (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 66–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69
See id. at 67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that looking outward when faced with an ambiguous text is “fully
consistent with cases in which, because the statutory provision had only one plausible textual reading, we did not
rely on such sources”).
70
In this shift, Justice Ginsburg’s Koons Buick opinion is consonant with what one scholar has noted to be generally
true of the Justice’s “labor and anti-discrimination opinions—although they begin with textual analysis[, they] rely
heavily on legislative history and purpose as well as on agency deference.” James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court
as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 892
(2009).
71
See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal
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rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative
interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable” (Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
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In discussing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, one scholar has written that, “[s]ince his appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1991, Justice Thomas’ judicial fidelity to textualism has served, like a lighthouse on the shore, as
a powerful beacon to the Rehnquist Court, constantly returning it safely to the original intent of the Framers.”
Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights
Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351, 351–52 (2002).
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Because, however, the statute “is not a model of the best practices in legislative drafting,”74 the
Justice finds it necessary to look beyond the letter of the text. Although Justice Thomas does
look outward, the “anything else” that the Justice consults is limited to the fact that parts (i) and
(ii) had been read in a particular way until 1995 and that the 1995 amendment added a part (iii)
without altering the extant parts.75 Absent any affirmative change, suggests Justice Thomas, no
interpretive change should take place.76
Alone in his dissent, Justice Scalia adopts an extreme textualist approach,77 asserting that
Congress did effect an affirmative change in the text when it amended the statute: by adding a
part (iii) to which part (ii) could not possibly apply, Justice Scalia argues, Congress made it
textually impossible for part (ii) to continue to be interpreted to govern part (i). Observing that
“[t]he ultimate question here is not the meaning of ‘subparagraph,’ but the scope of the exception
which contains that term,”78 Justice Scalia determines that a corollary of adding part (iii) to §
1640 (a)(2)(A) was to free part (i) of the $100–$1000 window that had been applied to it. Where
the majority found an accident—an unfortunate side effect that resulted, intention-free, from the
one deliberate change Congress made—Justice Scalia finds potential legislative economy, a
transformation made by absence of change. Justice Scalia faults the majority for employing the
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Id. at 68 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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“Canon of Canine Silence”79 to treat a change wrought by inaction as a non-change and argues
that the statute should be construed as it now reads, rather than as it once read. The results of
uncapping part (i) would not be catastrophic because the high-amount loans likely to yield large
damages are treated in parts (ii) and (iii), which do have fixed limits.80
Justice Scalia argues, further, that the Court should respect its limits: “‘It is beyond our
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think is
the preferred result.’”81 While Justice Kennedy describes such absolute adherence to the letter of
the law “wooden,” Justice Scalia argues it to be a means of avoiding the “ventriloquism” to
which the Court falls prey when “[t]he Congressional Record or committee reports are used to
make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were spoken or written by others.”82
Both pure textualism and pure intentionalism yield an unhealthy automatism.83 The
majority’s compromise gives hope that the Court’s determination of the current notice-ofrescission debate will be equally circumspect with respect to interpretive methodology.
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Id. at 73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 75–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. TILA’s Rescission Provision: A Statute of Limitation or Repose?
The Court’s ruling on another provision may make such circumspection difficult.
Whereas the damages-ceiling debate84 may anticipate the drama to unfold when the Court
decides the mechanics of TILA rescission, some circuits argue that Court’s decision in Beach,85
which addresses TILA’s rescission provision itself, bears directly upon the current circuit split.86
In Beach the Court reviewed a decision by Florida’s Supreme Court that conflicted with
decisions other courts had reached in interpreting the three-year limit set by § 1635(f).87 Florida
held that a borrower could rescind by affirmative defense in a suit filed after the three years had
elapsed.88 The Court considered—but rejected—the possibility that § 1635 is a classic “statute
of limitation governing only the institution of suit and accordingly has no effect when a borrower
claims a § 1635 right of rescission as a ‘defense in recoupment’ to a collection action.”89
The Court agreed that “as a general matter a defendant’s right to plead ‘recoupment’ . . .
survives the expiration of the period provided by a statute of limitation . . . .”90 “So long as the
plaintiff’s action is timely,” the Court noted, “a defendant may raise a claim in recoupment even
if he could no longer bring it independently, absent ‘the clearest congressional language’ to the
contrary.”91 Nevertheless, the Court found that “[t]he issue here is not whether limitation
statutes affect recoupment rights, but whether § 1635(f) is a statute of limitation.”92
The Court thus examined “‘whether [the three-year limit] operates, with the lapse of time,
to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim,’ or ‘merely to bar the remedy for its
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enforcement.’”93 The latter interpretation would be consistent with a statute of limitations and
would permit borrowers to assert rescission as an affirmative defense; the former interpretation,
in keeping with a statute of repose, would eliminate the possibility of rescinding, for any reason,
beyond the three-year window. 94 The Court held that TILA’s rescission provision extinguishes
the borrower’s right to rescind and makes no allowance for reviving the right once expired.95
The Beach Court’s method of analysis is striking: the Court employs both textualism and
intentionalism in a unanimous opinion. The Court begins by noting that, unlike “a typical statute
of limitation[, which provides] that a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain
period of time,”96 § 1635(f) “says nothing in terms of bringing an action.”97 “[In]stead,” the
Court observes, “[§ 1635(f)] provides that the ‘right of rescission [under the Act] shall expire’ at
the end of the time period.”98 The Court stresses that the rescission provision establishes for how
long the right to rescind lasts rather than the deadline for filing suit, and this in eminently direct
terms.99 Indeed, the Court finds the provision so clear that “[t]here is no reason . . . to resort to
the canons of construction that we use to resolve doubtful cases.”100
At this point, the Court’s logic begins to shift. Until now, the decision clung to the
statute’s actual words. After finding § 1635’s words clear, however, the Court looks elsewhere
in TILA and finds that Congress did insert words to mark other TILA provisions as statutes of
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limitation.101

Thus, the Court reasons, Congress chose not to include similar limitations

language in § 1635(f).102 Applying what Justice Scalia has branded the “Canon of Canine
Silence,”103 the Beach Court remarks: “Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”104
The Court then moves further from the text of § 1635, suggesting that, “[s]ince a
statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure, Congress may well have
chosen to circumscribe that risk, while permitting recoupment damages regardless of the date a
collection action may be brought.”105 The Court thus posits a guess—suitably adorned in the
conditional mood—at what Congressional aim might underlie § 1635(f)’s structure and function.
In closing, the Court declares that it has chosen to “respect Congress’s manifest intent by
concluding that the Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3year period of § 1635(f) has run. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Florida.”106 This emphatic conclusion is slippery, because Congressional intent is linked in the
opinion both to the absence of limitations language and to the choice to circumscribe the risk of
clouding title.107 The first of these reflects analytical inquiry; the second, clearly speculative
dicta.108

See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 532 U.S. 410, 416 (1998) (noting that “[t]he terms of a typical statute of
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As we turn to the rescission-mechanism split, we will see courts clash over the weight
due the Beach dicta. In theory, Beach is off-topic: whether § 1635(f) extinguishes a right or a
cause of action is not germane to whether notice muse be sent or a suit must be filed. The Beach
conclusion, however, is broad enough to suggest that timely notice coupled with late filing would
subvert Congress’s “manifest intent” to render the three-year period a sacrosanct outer limit. Is
the Court’s hypothesis regarding Congressional intent binding precedent upon lower courts?
III. The Current Circuit Split: How Does One Rescind under TILA?
When the Court interprets the rescission provision,109 it will necessarily either apply or
decline to apply Beach. If the Court finds Beach inapplicable, we may expect a fiery array of
interpretations similar to those we analyzed in Koons Buick.110 If the Court holds that Beach
applies, however, the conclusion that it is Congress’s “manifest intent” to terminate the right to
rescind after three years would force a finding that a complaint is necessary to trigger rescission.
To anticipate which way the Court may hold—and to assess whether the answer is bound to a
choice between textualism and intentionalism—we turn to the relevant Circuit decisions.

Pierre N. Laval, James Madison Lecture, Judging under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249, 1250 (2006). Laval explains the danger posed by overstated dicta:
We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through utterance of dictum
made to look like a holding-in disguise, so to speak. When we do so, we seek to
exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully possess. Also, we accept
dictum uttered in a previous opinion as if it were binding law, which governs
our subsequent adjudication. When we do so, we fail to discharge our
responsibility to deliberate on and decide the question which needs to be
decided.
Id.
108
See id. at 1258-59 (noting that though it can be difficult to distinguish dicta from holdings, this distinction is vial
in a system of stare decisis).
109
See supra Part I.B. for the text of the relevant statutory provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
110
See supra Part II.A.
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A. Intentionalist Decisions
In McOmie the Ninth Circuit declared itself bound to treat § 1635(f) as a statute of
repose.111 “Were we writing on a blank slate,” the court declared, “we might consider whether
notification within three years of the transaction could extend the time limit imposed by §
1635(f).”112 The Circuit promptly added a big “but,” stating that, “under the case law of this
court113 and the Supreme Court,114 rescission suits must be brought within three years from the
consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of rescission is delivered within that threeyear period.”115 Wistfully, the McOmie court bows before what it deems to be precedent and
blames stare decisis for its holding that a formal filing is necessary to trigger TILA rescission.
The Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Beach holding, however, is overly expansive: Beach
did not state the rule that the McOmie court attributes to it. The circuit court extrapolates the
Beach “rule” from the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he plain meaning of the Act . . . ‘permits no
federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of 1635(f) has run.’”116
The Ninth Circuit’s focus on “or otherwise”—which it over-reads—causes it to lose sight of the
question before it, namely whether notice constitutes an exercise of the right to rescind. By
treating Beach as precedent, the Ninth Circuit adopts the Court’s divination of Congressional
intention as binding. Because the Court’s position is not exactly on point, however, taking its
divination as an unassailable starting point is a second degree of abstraction. This second level
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of removal, in turn, leads the Ninth Circuit to use intent to change the meaning of clear language,
not just to construe unclear language.117
In Rosenfield,118 the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that consumers
must file a complaint in order to trigger TILA’s rescission provision119 and that Beach
controls.120 The Rosenfield court begins by noting that “an examination of the structure of the
right conferred in this case—that is, rescission—supports [its] conclusion.”121 The court stresses
that the equitable remedy of rescission “is not . . . appropriate . . . in circumstances where its
application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or impossible) enforcement.”122 The muddying
of title that would flow from accepting notice as sufficient to trigger rescission rises to the level
of prohibitive difficulty.123 Accordingly, the Rosenfield court states, “we ascertain no basis for
concluding that the TILA rescission remedy differs in any material respect from the general form
of rescission available in . . . analogous contexts.”124 The Rosenfield court acknowledges the
CFPB’s contrary position but dismisses the CFPB’s evidence as “mostly concerning matters of
state law.”125 The Tenth Circuit affirms that, as a statute of repose, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)
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“operates to completely extinguish the right being claimed after it lapses.”126 The Rosenfield
court, in other words, treats Beach as controlling.127
B. Textualist Decisions
In Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC,128 the Fourth Circuit arrives at the opposite result.
The Gilbert first considers “the plain meaning of the statute,” because “‘courts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is
complete.’”129 The Fourth Circuit finds the grail of “plain meaning” within the actual words of §
1635(f) and therefore declines to supplant or even gloss those words: “Simply stated, neither 15
U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse to
graft such a requirement upon them.”130
After confining itself to reading the lines—as opposed to between the lines—of Section
1635(f), the Gilbert court warns that “[w]e must not conflate the issue of whether a borrower has
exercised her right to rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been completed
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Id. at 1182 (alteration in the original).
In an unpublished opinion carrying no precedential weight, the Third Circuit similarly held Beach to control and,
consequently, also held that rescission requires the plaintiff to file a complaint within the three-year window. The
Williams court framed its holding in an interesting way, observing that
[i]t may be that an obligor may invoke the right to rescission by mere notice. Mere
invocation without more, however, will not preserve the right beyond the three-year
period. Rather, consistent with § 1635(f), a legal action to enforce the right must be filed
within the three-year period or the right will be “completely extinguishe[d].”
Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 410 F. App’x 495, 499 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed.
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In its precedential decision of February 5, 2013, however, the Third Circuit arrived at the opposite
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and the contract voided.”131 The Fourth Circuit thus draws a practical distinction between
exercising a right to rescind and actual rescission.132 “The former,” the Gilbert court insists, “is
the concern of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z, and a borrower exercises her right of rescission by
merely communicating in writing to her creditor her intent to rescind,”133 even though the
borrower must then take additional steps “[t]o complete the rescission and void the contract.”134
Like its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit requires either that “the creditor . . . acknowledge that
the right of rescission is available and the parties . . . unwind the transaction amongst themselves,
or [that] the borrower . . . file a lawsuit so that the court may enforce the right to rescind.”135 The
Gilbert court applies § 1635(f)’s three-year limit to the right to rescind, which can be exercised
by notice, rather than to rescission itself.
The Fourth Circuit was able to strike out on its own largely because it shrugged off the
interpretive shackles of Beach. Gilbert holds that Beach carries no precedential weight vis-à-vis
the rescission deadline. “Appellees’ reliance on [Beach] is misplaced,” the Gilbert court holds,
because “[t]he Beach Court did not address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind or
the timely exercise of that right.”136 Just as the Fourth Circuit adheres to the letter of the statute,
it also adheres to the letter of Beach, refusing to embroider meaning upon the Court’s words.
The Third Circuit took a similar stance in its February 2013 Sherzer decision, announcing
that, “[i]n resolving the question at issue here, we rely on the statutory language, not on the
debatable implications of dicta.”137 In determining what is required to trigger rescission under
TILA, the Third Circuit stressed that “nowhere in Beach does the Court address how an obligor
131
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must exercise his right of rescission within that three-year period,”138 which the Circuit described
as the key question raised by the appeal.139 Though the Sherzer court does note that “Beach is
consistent with [its] view” that notice suffices to rescind, its more definitive assertions
concerning the inapplicability of Beach dicta make it clear that “consistency” was not the court’s
paramount analytical objective.140
Nor does the Third Circuit rely on legislative history in its analysis. The Sherzer court
refers in passing to a 1988 addition to TILA141 but otherwise steers clear of the inquiry into
Congressional intent that informs the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Though the
Third Circuit never explicitly rejects intentionalism, it cements its textualist stance by relegating
the policy concerns raised by the lenders—concerns similar to those raised by the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits in expounding Congressional intent—to for-the-sake-of-completion analysis,
observing that, “[w]hile the Lenders and their amici raise several concerns worthy of out careful
attention, we find them unpersuasive for the reasons that follow.”142 This statement establishes a
clear line between the textual analysis that led to the court’s decision and the policy-rich analysis
that simply bolsters it.
Indeed, the Third Circuit frames its decision in purely textualist terms. The Sherzer court
“begin[s] with the statutory text,”143 and, after scrutinizing § 1635 as a whole,144 states that “the
answer to the question presented by this appeal is not pellucid, although we do think it is
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controlled by the statutory language.”145

The Circuit musters both affirmative evidence

indicating that notice constitutes rescission and negative evidence that “nothing in the text of the
statute supports the view that [filing a complaint is necessary]”146 to support its determination
that “the text of § 1635 and its implementing regulation . . . supports the view that to timely
rescind a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid notice of rescission.”147 Ultimately,
the Third Circuit rejects the view that rescission is triggered only by filing a complaint because
that view “would require us to infer that the statute contains additional, unwritten requirements
with which obligors must comply—an inference that seems particularly inappropriate in light of
the fact that TILA is a remedial statute that we must construe liberally.”148 The Third Circuit
thus finds support for its strict, text-based analysis in consumer-protective purpose of the statute.
IV. How Should the Supreme Court Resolve the Split?
The Court should also heed TILA’s stated purpose—to inform and protect consumers—
before honing in on the text of § 1635 itself when it resolves the present split.149 The Act’s
umbrella introduction states that TILA aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him
and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair
credit billing.”150 The Court should choose an interpretation that best reflects the goals set forth
by TILA’s introductory provision, in keeping with its own policy.151
Ironically, the textualist interpretation appears more in keeping with TILA objectives.
The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that borrowers may exercise their right to rescind by
145
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notifying the lender of their intent to do so within that three-year window.152 The Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, require that borrowers sue their lenders within three years of
entering into a loan agreement or forever lose the right to rescind.153 This intentionalist position
demands a level of awareness on the part of borrowers that seems incongruous with TILA’s
objectives.154 Nevertheless, it is not impossible that an intentionalist interpretation will carry the
day, given the Court’s past decisions.155

The Court reached a textualist-intentionalist

compromise in Koons Buick156 and shifted from textualism to intentionalism in Beach.157
Whatever its conclusion, the Court should begin by declaring Beach inapposite.158
Relevant only through its dicta, Beach should not be stretched to apply to rescission
mechanics.159 Rather than expand the influence of its reasoning, the Court should defer to the
CFPB, the agency now charged with TILA regulation.160 Deference is important in an abstract
sense as a means of maintaining the boundaries of the different branches of government.161 With
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See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.; see also O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, TILA Rescission Rights (June 20, 2012),
http://www.omm.com/tila-rescission-rights-06-18-2012/ (offering a concise summary of the split).
154
See Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at
23–24, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (2012) (No. 10-1442), 2012 WL 1074082, at *18–19.
155
Note that, with respect to its emphasis on legislative intent, the limited TILA jurisprudence explored above—see
supra Part II.—stands at odds with a statistically-confirmed Court trend: “[The Court’s] practice after 1986 (when
Scalia joined the Court) has reflected the influence of new textualism. . . . the Court has been somewhat more
willing to find statutory plain meaning and less willing to consult legislative history, either to confirm or rebut that
plain meaning. . . .” Eskridge, supra note 1, at 227.
156
See supra Parts II.A. and III.
157
See supra Part II.B.
158
See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 15, 2012 WL 1074082, at *11 (“Beach is not directly on point. . . .”).
159
“When [courts] make law in dictum, the likelihood is high that it will be bad law.” Laval, supra note 107, at
1260. See generally id. at 1258–62 (stressing that over-reading dicta is particularly pernicious in a system based on
stare decisis).
160
See generally Letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Assistant Professor of L. at Albany L. Sch., to Jennifer J. Johnson,
Sec’y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010/October/20101025/R-1390/R1390_102110_54026_556309269172_1.pdf (arguing the importance of allowing the CFPB to formulate a coherent
regulatory scheme).
161
See Aaron R. Cooper, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era of Private Governance, 99
GEO. L.J. 1454–55 (2010–11) (describing judicial review of agency determinations as a means of making sure that
the agency is not taking an impermissible amount of legislative power, not as an opportunity for the Court to
“substitute its own judgment for that of the political branch” when that political branch is acting within the scope of
its authority).
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respect to TILA rescission, moreover, the CFPB’s analysis is compelling and appropriately
consumer-protective.162
What the Court should not do is resolve the textualist-intentionalist debate that has
colored TILA litigation in general, and the rescission-provision split in particular.163 The manner
in which the Circuits have articulated their decisions invites the Court to choose a victorious
methodology.164 By resolving the less conspicuous issues surrounding dicta and deference,
however, the Court can reach a decision without accepting the Circuits’ implicit invitations to
side with a particular interpretive school.165
A. The Scope and Applicability of Beach
The holdings of the Supreme Court are binding upon all the courts of the land. Dicta,
however, are not considered binding.166 The two can be difficult to distinguish, as the pragmatic
Judge Posner has noted:167 “A dictum is a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been
deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding.”168 It stands apart
from the opinion’s binding core because it “may not have received the full and careful

The CFPB’s fidelity to TILA’s purposes, see supra Part I., argue strongly in favor of granting deference, because
it is precisely “[w]here an agency’s decision or interpretation of a statute violates a canon of statutory construction,
or where the agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the public interest patina of the original statute, or where a
court deems the agency’s action ‘unreasonable,’ [that] the agency’s decisions will be accorded no deference.”
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative
Agencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 684 (1991–92).
163
See supra Parts II. and III.
164
See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, “The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 157 U. PA. L REV. 117, 119–31
(arguing that textualism can brook no compromise with intentionalist or purposovist interpretive imperatives, such
that any choice other than pure textualism is a choice against textualism).
165
See infra Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
166
See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000))
(noting that, “[i]n [the] context [of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to AEDPA, “clearly established
law” signifies “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions.”).
167
Posner is far from the only dicta-theorist, but a full exploration of the hazy, even fluid, dictum-holding boundary
is beyond the scope of the present study. As a notable counterpart to Posner’s proposed workmanlike explanation of
dicta is the gemologist-inspired approach that its creators “call the ‘Judicial Four Cs.’ Jewelers evaluate carat, cut,
color, and clarity in assessing diamonds; we evaluate constraint, consideration, clarity, and candor in forming
understandings of what to treat as holding and dicta within judicial opinions.” Michael Abramovicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017 (2005).
168
Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986).
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consideration of the court that uttered it.”169 For Judge Posner—and the Seventh Circuit—
“[w]hat is at stake in distinguishing holding from dictum is that a dictum is not authoritative. It
is the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject.”170
Posner thus invites us to “ask what reasons there are against a court’s giving weight to a passage
found in a previous opinion.”171 As Judge Posner notes, there are many potential reasons for
disregarding dicta; “reasons for thinking that a particular passage was not a fully measured
judicial pronouncement, that it was not likely to be relied on by readers, and indeed that it may
not have been part of the decision that resolved the case or controversy on which [a federal]
court’s jurisdiction depended.”172

Posner’s know-a-dictum-by-its-stakes argument ties

“dictumitude,” for lack of a better word, to reader response.173
Not all circuits are as willing to risk jettisoning a holding along with the bathwater of
dicta as is the Seventh Circuit.174 The Third Circuit explained that “[e]ven if what we read as the
holdings . . . could be characterized as dicta and therefore not binding on us, such dicta are
highly persuasive. Indeed, with regard to statements made by the Supreme Court in dicta, ‘we
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Id.
United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir.1988).
171
Id.
172
Id. at 293.
173
Fascinatingly, the Ninth Circuit glossed Posner’s stakes-based definition in a parenthetical citation as one that
“adopt[s] a pragmatic definition of dictum based upon whether the previous panel fully considered the issue and
intended for future interpreters to rely on it.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 916 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added). This is a mischaracterization and, as subtle a misstatement as it may seem, it is significant inasmuch as it
paints Posner’s statement with an intentionalist brush when, in fact, his working definition of dicta corresponds to a
textualist approach. See Morrell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation,
30 J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2003) (“[T]extualism . . . employs a reader-centered strategy . . . for attributing meaning to a
statutory text . . . . Intentionalism . . . employs a writer-centered strategy for attributing meaning to statutory text,
emphasizing ‘meaning(s)’ ‘intended’ by the writer . . . .”). Here, as with respect to the TILA rescission provision,
the Ninth Circuit focuses on intent. See infra Part IV.
174
The Seventh Circuit has a strong—and generalized—predilection for straight-shooting and has stated its
preference for streamlining in eminently quotable terms. See, e.g., DeShields v. Int’l Resort Props., 463 Fed. App’x
117, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”)); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212, 217
(7th Cir. 1982) (“We deprecate decision by metaphor.”).
170
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do not view [them] lightly.’”175 Indeed, the Circuit noted, “[b]ecause the Supreme Court uses
dicta to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its limited docket
. . . [t]o ignore what we perceive as persuasive statements by the Supreme Court is to place our
rulings, and the analysis that underlays them, in peril.”176 The Ninth Circuit has also noted the
predictive potential and resultant premium borne by Court dicta, remarking that “dicta of the
Supreme Court have a weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what that
Court might hold. We should not blandly shrug them off because they were not a holding.”177
The Tenth Circuit has adopted an even more deferential posture with respect to Supreme Court
dicta: “we are bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright
holdings, particularly when the dicta [are] recent and not enfeebled by later statements.”178
Here, however—even for those who favor expansive readings of, and according
considerable deference to, Supreme Court dicta—it is problematic to find the Beach Court’s
hypothesis as to Congressional intent authoritative. Although the Beach Court did declare that it
was respecting the “manifest intent” of Congress, it was less confident about Congressional
intent just a few lines earlier, where it discussed what “Congress may well have chosen.”179 The
Court had already reached its holding based on a textual analysis before offering intentionalist
“evidence” as supplementary support for its decision;180 the intentionalist argument is a tack-on.
Having reached its decision on other grounds, the Court indulges in somewhat conflicted

Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003)).
176
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
177
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
178
United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
179
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 532 U.S. 410, 419 (1998) (emphasis added).
180
The Court even marks this supplement with a revelatory introductory sentence: “The Act, however, has left even
less to chance (if that is possible) than its ‘expire’ provision would allow, standing alone.” Id. Though the provision
is enough “standing alone,” in other words, the Court will offer even more support of its conclusion. See id.
175
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speculation regarding Congress’s intent, creating dicta.181

And, because the Court’s first

statement impugns the confidence of its second, these dicta should be treated with caution.182
The Tenth Circuit did not display the requisite caution with respect to Beach dicta.
Although it purports to reach a conclusion “consistent with Beach,” the Rosenfield court’s
holding that “TILA establishes a right of action that is generally redressable only when a party
seeks recognition of it by invoking the power of the courts”183 is clearly beyond the scope of the
Beach Court’s discussion of affirmative defenses.
The Ninth Circuit similarly distorted dicta in reading Beach to hold that “rescission suits
must be brought within three years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice
of rescission is delivered within that three-year period.”184 The Ninth Circuit adds one and one
and gets three, with the missing addend coming from its assumption that when the Court said
“completely extinguished” in one context, it intended that the extinguishment be universal
because (1) § 1635(f) is a statute of repose and (2) statutes of repose mean sue or see the right
extinguished.185 Not only does Beach never mention statutes of repose, but there are many
statutes of repose that do not require filing suit.186 The Ninth Circuit’s syllogism is thus flawed.

181

Why the dicta are present is an interesting question. They could have been included by compromise, to
accommodate the Justices’ different perspectives. They could also serve the function of keeping the textualistintentionalist debate alive and thriving. Or, of course, they could have been included to suggest that, even in the
face of a clear text, an intentionalist inquiry into Congressional reasoning should be conducted. See Defining Dicta,
supra note 167, at 971–2.
182
Stanley Fish has written that “[f]iguring out what a multiple-authored text means is in principle no different from
figuring out what a single-authored text means; both require the same ‘necessary construction’ of an intention that
the words alone won’t yield up.” Stanley Fish, Intention and the Canons of Legal Interpretation, THE N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR (July 16, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/intention-and-the-canonsof-legal-interpretation/. The idea of intention as a construction, of something substantial that is built and that can
take on a presence of its own, independent of the words from which it was crafted, is a helpful way to understand
how the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are able to arrive at conclusions that exceed the scope of Beach while purporting
to flow necessarily from Beach.
183
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in the original).
184
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012).
185
See id.
186
See the CFPB’s excellent discussion of statutes of repose, CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 25–29, 2012
WL 1074082, at *20–24. The CFPB’s analysis is discussed infra Part IV.B.
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The two circuits that have read Beach to be controlling have done so by guessing what
the Court intended to say and by applying what the Court did say on one topic to a discrete issue.
The Court should declare Beach inapposite even if it agrees that borrowers must file to
rescind.187 A determination that filing is necessary should be reached through case-specific
analysis; it should not be the child of chance, the results of a fortuitous misapplication of dicta.188
If the Court holds that Beach applies, it would implicitly condone using perceptions of its own
intent as a proxy for legislative intent.189

As Michael Sabet notes, “[i]n a dire economic

atmosphere where predatory lending has contributed to widespread home foreclosures, courts
should not take it upon themselves to speculate on alternative theories of congressional intent,
especially when the purpose, history, and letter of the law are so clear.”190
B. An Alternative: Look to the CFPB
Even without heeding Sabet’s exhortation to look solely to the letter of the law, however,
the Court need not resort to mangling the square Beach peg until it fits into the round hole of
TILA rescission mechanics. There is highly persuasive authority available to aid in interpreting
§ 1635(f) and Regulation Z: the CFPB.
187

Thomas L. Fowler’s astute analysis of the risks posed by overstated dicta in an unrelated case captures general
principles of jurisprudence that should guide the Court in its ultimate resolution of TILA rescission:
The analysis and the language chosen by the Court in Fly obscure the normal
guideposts that lower courts use to make this holding versus dictum
determination. As a result, the lower courts will be encouraged to abandon the
difficult determination of what the law is and instead substitute the
determination of what the law will be based upon the various statements found
in the opinion without regard to whether such statements are holding or dictum.
Thomas L. Fowler, Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of Law, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV.
253, 258 (2000).
188
See generally id. at 296–302 (discussing why it is important to maintain clear boundaries between dicta and
holdings).
189
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 532 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1998) (emphasis added). For an excellent cautionary tale
regarding the perils and pitfalls of trying to divine the Court’s intent, see Brian J. Dunne, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 991,
1003–12 (2007) (studying the methodological conflicts in the wake of the Court’s decision in Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)). As Dunne notes, “While Gonzaga no doubt commands a text-focused analysis in
determining § 1983 enforceability of Medicaid Act provisions, lower courts have divided into two distinct camps
regarding the proper ‘type’ of textual analysis.” Id. at 1003.
190
Sabet, supra note 208, at 21.
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The CFPB’s responsibilities include “[c]onduct[ing] rule-making, supervision, and
enforcement for Federal consumer financial protection laws.”191 “Congress granted the [CFPB]
the authority to interpret and promulgate rules regarding TILA.”192 “With the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, [it] transferred this authority
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Bureau on July 21, 2011.”193
Aggressively asserting its authority over TILA, the CFPB “welcome[s] . . . suggestions of
pending cases that might make good candidates for the amicus program.”194 The Bureau’s
amicus program has filed briefs in each rescission case.195 The CFPB’s interventionist policy
matches the latitude Congress explicitly granted to the executive branch, the branch it tasked
with determining how to enforce the Act.196 Congress has passed the baton of TILA regulation
from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB and, with it, this regulatory latitude.
In its amicus briefs,197 the CFPB argues that “[t]he language of § 1635 is plain: Within
three years of loan consummation, consumers must exercise their right of rescission by notifying
their lender that they are doing so.”198 The CFPB adds that, “[i]f there were any ambiguity in
that mandate, Regulation Z resolves it by also specifying that consumers exercise the right to
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CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2012).
CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 154 at 7 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12)(O), 5512(b)(1), 5581(b)(1)).
193
Id. (citing Pub L. No. 111-243, §§ 1061(b)(1), (d), 2010), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5581(b)(1), (d); Designated
Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57, 252 (Sept. 20, 2010).
194
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
195
See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More To Come, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2012,
2:10
PM),
http://www.credit.net/report_news.asp?si=5846146485212&VendorID=200000&docid=AMX_MONDAQNEWS_1
47757036 (“The Bureau sees the filing of amicus briefs as an important way to ensure that the statutes it oversees
are correctly and consistently interpreted by the courts, even in cases in which the CFPB is not itself a named
party.”).
196
See supra Part I, discussing how Congress has transferred TILA regulation from the Federal Reserve Board to the
CFPB. It is only logical that the same regulatory leeway transfers as well. The question of whether judicial
deference passes is more complex. See infra pp. 34–35.
197
The CFPB’s amicus briefs feature identical standards sections and differ only in applying the standards to the
particular facts of each case. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 191 (collecting the CFPB
amicus briefs).
198
CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 15, 2012 WL 1074082, at *10.
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rescind by providing written notice to the lender.”199 Because there is no room for confusion, in
other words, inquiry should begin and end with the text.
Ironically, if the CFPB is correct that regulation is unambiguous, there is less reason for
the Court to defer to it. If the Court finds Regulation Z unclear, it will have to address whether
and to what extent administrative deference has shifted from the Board to the Bureau200 just as it
will need to discuss the deference due a position expounded in an amicus brief.201 These
complicated treks through the murky waters of deference rules will only be necessary if the
Court determines that the regulation is ambiguous.202 If the regulation is clear, the Court will
apply it without consulting the regulatory agency.203
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Id.
See TROUTMAN SANDERS, http://www.troutmansanders.com/judicial-deference-to-agencys-interpretation-of-tilareaches-new-high-water-mark-02-01-2011/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2012) (“When authority over TILA interpretation
transfers to the new CFPB, presumably this judicial deference to the agency interpretation will follow. For this and
other reasons, there should be no wonder why the struggle over the creation of, and the new leadership for, and the
role of Congressional over[sight] over, the CFPB was and is such a hot topic in Washington.”). See also Melanie E.
Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1341, 1361–66 (1999) (exploring the implications for judicial deference when Congress transfers authority
from one agency to another).
201
Particularly relevant to determining the level of deference due the CFPB in this matter is “Skidmore deference,”
which recognizes that “the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [relevant federal agency], while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). “The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id. According to Skidmore, the fact that the
agency’s determination is presented not through the adversarial system but, rather, through an amicus brief is no
reason to discount it as persuasive authority. See id. at 139–140.
202
As the Court recently stated,
[w]e need not decide which party's interpretation is more persuasive, however;
both are plausible, and the text alone does not permit a more definitive reading.
Accordingly, we find Regulation Z to be ambiguous as to the question
presented, and must therefore look to the Board’s own interpretation of the
regulation for guidance in deciding this case.
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011). When Chase was decided, the CFPB had not yet
assumed control of regulating TILA.
203
The CFPB filed its first rescission-provision brief in Rosenfield. The Tenth Circuit’s only reference to the
CFPB’s brief is relegated to a footnote and does not address agency deference. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank,
USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We acknowledge receipt of two amicus curiae briefs, one filed by
the [CFPB] a federal regulatory agency . . . . Although these briefs largely cover the same terrain as the parties’
arguments, they are helpful. We do exercise appropriate care, however, to keep our primary focus on the parties’
arguments.” (citations omitted)). The Third Circuit barely gave the CFPB a passing nod in Sherzer; it certainly did
not raise the question of deference. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., ____ F.3d ____, _____ (3d Cir. 2013)
200
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Even without the benefit of formal deference, however, the CFPB’s arguments are
persuasive because they advance both TILA’s consumer-protective purpose and public policy.
“Congress enacted § 1635,” the Bureau notes, “in response to fraudulent home-improvement
schemes in which ‘homeowners, particularly the poor,’ were ‘trick[ed] . . . into signing contracts
at exorbitant rates, which turn out to be liens on the family residences.’”204 To require that
borrowers sue “is contrary to the plain language of the provision and contravenes the purpose of
the statutory scheme to provide consumers a private, non-judicial mechanism to rescind
mortgage loans.”205 Indeed, the CFPB regards rescission as a means of avoiding litigation and
conserving “valuable judicial resources.”206

If a lender wishes to challenge a borrower’s

rescission, then the lender can sue to determine “whether rescission was accomplished because
the party was entitled to rescind in the first instance.”207 The CFPB’s interpretation places the
onus of filing a complaint on the lender, who is presumably more sophisticated and better able to
assess the wisdom of litigation than the borrower. This is a more socially responsible position
than the suit requirement, which would reward inaction on the part of lenders and force
borrowers into court, discouraging private settlement and rendering notice superfluous.208
The Court should apply the CFPB’s sound interpretation of TILA’s rescission provision.
In this way, the Court would respect both the plain language enacted by the legislature, to which

(“The Sherzers and their amicus, the [CFPB] argue that [notice suffices].”). The CFPB also filed an amicus brief
with the Eighth Circuit, so it will be interesting to see whether it addresses deference. To keep track of CFPB
amicus filings, see CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 197.
204
CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 186, at 9, 2012 WL 1074082, at *4 (quoting 90 CONG. REC. H14384 (daily ed.
May 22, 1968) (statement of Rep. Sullivan)) (citing 90 CONG. REC. H14384 (statement of Rep. Patman)).
205
Id. at 30, 2012 WL 1074082, at *25.
206
Id. at 10, 2012 WL 1074082, at *5.
207
Id. at 21, 2012 WL 1074082, at *16.
208
See Michael Sabet, Comment, Slamming the Door in the Consumer’s Face: Courts’ Inadequate Enforcement of
TILA Disclosure Violations and the False Hope of a Foreclosure Defense, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 183, 20–21 (2010).
If the consumers’ right to sue expires after three years, then there is a perverse incentive for lenders to ignore
borrowers’ notices of rescission or, perhaps worse, to respond to them in a misleading, string-a-long manner, so that
borrowers miss the three-year filing limit. See generally id.; see also CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 23–24,
2012 WL 1074082, at *19.
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the CFPB adheres, and Congress’s intent to allow the executive branch to fill TILA’s broad
outlines with the details of enforcement. It could well be that the policy advocated by the CFPB
will prove disastrous,209 but this is not a foregone conclusion.210 This politicized matter is best
left to the executive and, thus, at least theoretically, to the collective will of the voting public.211
By respecting the regulatory power that Congress conferred upon the executive, moreover, the
Court would satisfy the mandates of both textualism and intentionalism in a way that holding its
decision in Beach to govern would not.212

The fear of the dangers of cloudy title underlies the Tenth Circuit’s decision, see supra Part III.A. It is also of
great concern to the three vast banking organizations that banded together to file an amicus brief in the Rosenfield
case. Brief of the Amici Curiae Am. Bankers Assoc., Consumer Bankers Assoc., and Consumer Mortgage Coalition
in Support of Appellees at 9, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (No. 10-1442), 2012 WL 1656043, at *2
(arguing that allowing mere notice to trigger rescission “would cast a long shadow of uncertainty over the housing
finance market, a market that depends on certainty and predictability. The price for that uncertainty would fall
squarely on the very individuals that TILA was meant to benefit—borrowers.”). The banking associations’ brief
also points to potential injustice that rescission-by-notice could work upon lenders: notice-triggered rescission
“would allow a borrower to strip a lender who complied with TILA of its security interest instantaneously and
unilaterally.” Id. Aaron B. Millar paints the potential consequences to lenders in vivid detail: “Imagine this
scenario: Hours before the foreclosure sale, the mortgage lender receives a fax from the defaulting borrower’s
lawyer stating that the borrower rescinds the loan . . . because the finance charge in the loan disclosures was
understated by $ 36.” Aaron B. Millar, The Mortgage Lender’s Primer on a TILA Rescission Claim, 25 UTAH BAR
J. 40, 40 (2012).
210
See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 186, at 23–24 & n.4, 2012 WL 1074082, at *18–19 (countering the
objections raised by the Bankers’ Associations—see supra note 209—by stressing that requiring notice within the
three-year period alerts the lender to the customer’s rescission and allows the lender to contest the rescission, at
which point the borrower would have a finite period of time—that the courts will have to determine—to file suit);
see also Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., _____ F.3d _____, _____–_____ (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing the policy
implications of rescission-by-notice at length and concluding that, though this method of rescission could create
some complications, these complications did not constitute a “reason to disregard the text of the statute” and that “it
is for Congress—not the courts—to determine” such policy matters).
211
One scholar argues that the judiciary should only make determinations with regard to policy choice in the
absence of statutory clarity and any indicia of legislative and political preferences and that, even under those
circumstances, “the judiciary should exclude those policy preferences it is confident could not get enacted in the
current political process.” EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 234 (2008). Given that the CFPB is a creature of the current political regime, the Court should
hesitate to adopt an interpretation diametrically opposed to the one that the CFPB proposes. See also GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163–66 (1982) (arguing that the formerly antimajoritarian
role formerly played by courts as makers of the common law should be restricted to matters of constitutional
adjudication in light of the proliferation of statutes and the resultant change in the nature of law-making in this
country).
212
See Mullins, supra note 145, at 31 (suggesting that modern theoretical approaches to statutory construction
“recognize that neither ‘textualism’ nor ‘intentionalism’ provide, by themselves, a satisfactory theory”).
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V. Conclusion
Resolution of TILA’s rescission requirements is but a cert-seeking petition away.
Because (1) TILA’s stated aim is one of consumer protection, (2) Congress built room into TILA
to allow the government to adapt Regulation Z to the deceptive practices of creditors, and (3) the
plain language of Regulation Z suggests that notice triggers rescission, the Court should hold that
borrowers may rescind by notifying lenders of their intent to do so.
In reaching this determination, the Court will not need to defer to the CFPB’s
interpretation of the statute. The CFPB’s policy arguments are compelling on their own terms.
While the textualist courts, true to the methodology they espouse, declined to season their
analyses with sociopolitical considerations, the CFPB showed no such reluctance. The CFPB
explained in convincing detail how the notice-only requirement fits both TILA’s stated purpose
and the hardships borrowers are currently facing.
Even if the Court should determine that one must sue to rescind, however, it should
decline to massage the boundaries of precedent. The Court should declare Beach inapplicable to
rescission mechanics. By analyzing the provision independently of its earlier decision, the Court
should confirm that its intent cannot be substituted for inquiry into Congressional intent.
Although the Court should take the intentionalist Circuits to task for misrepresenting
dicta as precedent, the Court should not frame its correction as a condemnation of intentionalism.
The current split appears to be a textualist-intentionalist tussle, but victory need not and should
not be tied to a mode of analysis. The multiplicity of methodologies that led to the feisty Koons
Buick opinion keeps statutory construction lively and staves off wooden positivism. Ideally,
analytical sparks will fly again when the Court decides the rescission-provision split.
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